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The Minnesota Plan: A Responsible
Alternative to No-Fault Insurance
John E. Simonet* David 3. Sargent*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the April, 1970 issue of this journal,1 Senator Jack Davies
proposed a new automobile insurance plan, the central language
of which reads:
Liability for damages arising from the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle within this state is abolished except as to damage
to property other than motor vehicles and their contents. Sec. 2,
subd. (1).
No longer, if this proposed bill were enacted, would a motorist in
Minnesota be held responsible for his carelessness in causing in-
jury to another. A proposal so contrary to what people now gen-
erally consider to be their legal and moral obligation, and which
would alter the structure of auto insurance in this state so radi-
cally, merits pause and, perhaps, prompts skepticism.
Senator Davies calls his bill the 'Minnesota Plan for No-
Fault Auto Insurance." As a substitute for tort liability the bill
proposes compulsory, first party, no-fault insurance. In an at-
tempt to limit the cost of the insurance, the bill would broaden
eligibility for coverage but greatly restrict recoverable benefits.
While there is proper concern for needed reform, one wonders if
there is any widespread public support for no-fault insurance.
A United States Department of Transportation survey of heads
of car-owning families disclosed that 65 percent were satisfied
with their present auto insurance and only 22 percent were dis-
satisfied and concluded that "it appears that there is receptivity
to change but that as of now there exists neither overwhelming
support for, nor overwhelming opposition to, a change in the in-
surance system toward some no fault alternative."
3
* Member of the Minnesota Bar.
** Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School
1. Davies, The Minnesota Proposal for No-Fault Auto Insurance,
54 Mum. L. Rsv. 921 (1970). Senator Davies proposed essentially the
same plan as was set out in the article at the 1969 legislative session
as Senate File -753; it was voted down, 10 to 5, in the Senate Com-
merce Committee.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PuBxac A Turmrs TowARw AuTo INsuR-
AscE 9 (1970).
3. Id. at 77. The DOT studies, while helpful, must be interpreted
with caution. For example, the same study reports that toward the end
of the interview, after various features of auto insurance were dis-
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Jack Davies assigns "four-fifths" of the ideas in his proposed
bill4 to Professors Keeton and O'Connell, whose pioneering work,
Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim, was published in 1965.0
Since then, studies have continued; several states are considering
"no-fault" and Massachusetts has passed a no-fault law. The
striking characteristic of most "no-fault" plans is their ambiva-
lence toward fault. Indeed, frequently the appellation "no-fault"
is a misnomer. Of the seven best known plans, five retain some
measure of fault liability.6 Some, if not all, of the plans also give
weight, if less directly, to personal accountability for accidents in
the setting of insurance rates.7
This article proposes to examine some of the assumptions un-
derlying the "no-fault" plans, particularly the Minnesota pro-
posal, and to suggest a better Minnesota plan, already being im-
plemented, for automobile accident reparations.
II. SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING NO-FAULT
The Davies bill rests on several basic suppositions. It as-
sumes that personal responsibility in causing auto accidents is
outmoded; that negligence is often difficult to prove;8 that negli-
cussed with the respondents, 44 percent of the people indicated favor
with a "no-fault" system, while 36 percent opted for the tort system.
Id. at 9-10. However, the question put to the respondents was:
In most states, this is how automobile liability insurance is
set up now: if you are involved in an accident, you have a
claim against another person (or his insurance company) only
if you can prove that the other person alone is at fault. Would
you say that this is a good system, a bad system, or what?
Id. at 72 (emphasis in the original). This question, of course, distorts
the Minnesota situation where there is comparative negligence. Even so,
as stated in the text, the DOT studies did not disclose any great agita-
tion about change to no-fault. As to the public's attitude in Minne-
sota, see note 14 infra.
4. Davies, supra note 1, at 922.
5. It should not be thought that the Keeton-O'Connell Plan is a
new idea. It is really a revival of the old Columbia Plan, first pro-
posed in 1932, which has ever since languished. Compensation for
Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 785 (1932).
6. The Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan, the Cotter Plan,
Senator Hart's Uniform Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, the Social Pro-
tection Plan of Puerto Rico and the Massachusetts Personal Protection
Insurance Law all retain a measure of fault. Only the American In-
surance Association Protection Plan completely eliminates fault. The
New York Plan permits a tort suit in the restricted case of a nonresi-
dent victim.
7. Hughey, The Cost of a Revolution, TRIAL 17 (Oct.-Nov. 1970).
8. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTETION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VIcTIm 15-22 (1965).
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gence in tort bears little relationship to personal fault," and that,
in any event, most accidents are really not anyone's fault.10
Denying the ability of the trier of fact in litigation to make a
fair determination of fault cast doubt upon the efficacy of the jury
and court system. If fault is really unfathomable, one might sup-
pose that the same is true of guilt in the criminal case; yet no one
suggests abolishing our system of criminal justice on this ground.
It is true that a jury bases its findings on evidence adduced at
trial, evidence which often consists of conflicting statements col-
ored by faulty memories, imperfect observations, self-interest
and even fraud. But the difficulty in fact finding is more theo-
retical than practical. Any experienced trial judge or lawyer can
testify that as a trial unfolds, with its rhythm of direct and cross-
examination, a fairly reliable reconstruction of the salient events
emerges.". Being themselves acquainted with the vicissitudes of
automobile driving, jurors generally arrive without too much
trouble at a sensible verdict. This is borne out by a jury study
project which found that in 80 percent of personal injury cases
the presiding judge agreed with the jury as to the findings of lia-
bility.12 There is nothing esoteric about the fault concept; it is a
proposition which, especially in automobile cases, lends itself well
to the common sense of jurors. In most accidents it is likely that
each party is negligent to some degree, and the doctrine of com-
parative negligence, recently adopted in Minnesota, recognizes
this. The Minnesota jury can now apportion responsibility and
so better fashion a just result.
The argument that actual negligence is divorced from per-
sonal fault is more difficult to understand. Tort law provides
that a motorist is held to the objective standard of care of the
reasonably prudent person; breach of that standard is negligence.
Critics argue that this standard overlooks personal behavior or
conditions, such as personality traits, poor eyesight, age or psy-
chological pressures, which should excuse fault in the personal
moral sense.' 3 It should be remembered, however, that the stand-
9. See, e.g., James, An Evaluation of the Fault Concept 32 TE'N,.
L. REv. 394, 395-97 (1965).
10. O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299
(1963).
11. Professor Keeton concedes that most trial lawyers agree negli-
gence is provable without undue difficulty in auto accident cases. See P,
KEEToN, VENTRING To Do JusncE 130 (1969).
12. W. BLum & H. KALVEN, PUBLIc LAW PERsPEcTIVEs ON A PRIVATE
LAw PRoBLM 11 (1965).
13. James, supra note 9, at 395-97.
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ard of reasonable care is the care a reasonable person would use
"under like circumstances" and that a jury, while it applies an
objective standard, does so in a human context and takes into ac-
count the myriad "circumstances" of the parties, thus adjusting
abstract rules to fit the particular case.
When no-fault advocates talk about the difficulties of as-
sessing fault, many of them really are saying fault is irrelevant.
This is, paradoxically, both the main point and the weakest point
in the no-fault case. The contention, it would seem, runs con-
trary to the deep-seated conviction of most people that a person
should be responsible for his conduct. Negligence is really a sort
of carelessness, and carelessness is not a technical legal concept.
The idea of negligence is not an exclusive preserve of judges and
lawyers; rather, it is a principle society as a whole has derived
from its common experience as a sensible rule of decent conduct.
It should come as no surprise then, that a Minnesota Poll in 1968
reported that 60 percent of the Minnesota residents questioned
thought a Keeton-O'Connell plan which would eliminate fault-
finding in auto accidents to be a poor idea.14
Perhaps the first question asked at the scene of an auto acci-
dent is "Who is hurt?" and the second question is "How did it
happen?" The tort system seeks to find the answers to both
questions. The no-fault system considers the second question
unimportant. 15 It is doubtful that the public would agree. Even
Professor Keeton admits that "we shall not soon exorcise the con-
cept of negligence from the interrelated legal and ethical thought
of our community."' 0
If fault is irrelevent, one might expect the sole remaining
question of compensation to be treated in similarly fatalistic
terms. We find this to be true with no-fault advocates. Only
net economic loss is compensated. Nothing is awarded to vin-
dicate innocence, for innocence is irrelevant, and nothing is al-
14. Minneapolis Tribune, Sept. 8, 1968, § B, at 12, col. 1. A bal-
anced sampling of 600 adult men and women were asked: "It has been
suggested when there is an accident involving two cars, that each driver
be paid damages by his own insurance company without trying to de-
termine if one driver was at fault. Does that sound like a good idea
or a poor idea to you?" Sixty percent said it was a poor idea, 34 percent
said the suggestion sounded like a good idea, and six percent made
no evaluation.
15. "No-fault auto insurance will eliminate most auto injury law
suits by removing the fact issues relating to liability and damage eval-
uation which make dispute and litigation inevitable." Davies, supra
note 1, at 945.
16. R. KEETON, supra note 11, at 156.
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lowed for pain and suffering or physical loss, for traffic victims
are not victims of irresponsible drivers but mere casualties of an
impersonal fate. Motoring becomes simply a health hazard like
exposure. to measles. An auto accident, however, unlike getting
ill and unlike other kinds of accidents, is a violent occurrence
usually involving two or more motor vehicles. The conduct of
the drivers generally has at least something to do with the vio-
lence occurring. To tell the participants the injury to their per-
sons and property was due to uncontrollable fate and no one's
fault is unrealistic.
Thus, the Keeton-O'Connell plan does not tell the auto vic-
tim that the person who caused his injuries is never accountable
for his conduct. Keeton-O'Connell retains negligence suits in
cases where pain and suffering exceed $5000 or other damages ex-
ceed $10,000. If, as Davies says, this is "logically inconsistent,"'1
it does confirm Holmes' observation that the life of the law is not
logic but experience. Under the new Massachusetts "no-fault"
law,'8 an injured plaintiff can still sue in tort for pain and suffer-
ing if he can show such whimsical criteria as a "fracture" or $500
in medical bills; indeed, it would seem the Massachusetts "no-
fault" law preserves fault in all cases of any consequence. Sen-
ator Philip Hart's bill filed in the 91st Congress would preserve
the negligence action for "catastrophic harm," a term which is
liberally defined.
The Davies bill, on the other hand, more nearly eliminates
personal responsibility, but even it makes exceptions. The dura-
bility of the fault concept apparently accounts for a curious pro-
vision in the Davies bill. Section 2, subd. (3), says:
A person injured by the grossly negligent driving of an-
other may recover punitive damages from the grossly negligent
driver.
No insurer may contract to indemnify for punitive damages
awarded under this subdivision. A principal is not liable un-
der this subdivision for the grossly negligent driving of his
agent.
If the Davies bill sought to bury fault, this is resurrection
with a vengeance. Not only does the proposal expose any motor-
ist to a lawsuit for "grossly negligent driving"-the term is no-
where defined in the bill-but it prohibits a motorist from ob-
taining insurance to cover himself for the risk. The intoxicated
driver in Minnesota may or may not be grossly negligent,'9 but
17. Davies, supra note 1, at 932.
18. MAss. GEr. LAws ANx. ch. 231, § 6D (1970).
19. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246,
143 N.W.2d 230 (1966).
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in either event, under the no-fault plan, he recovers compensa-
tion on the same basis as the party he harms.20
It has been said that "[t] he concept of liability based on fault
is deeply rooted in our society and will not be lightly cast
aside."' 2 1 Why this is so-and the statement is that of no-fault
proponents-is perhaps a question better suited to the disci-
plines of moral philosophy and psychology than law. However,
it seems that one reason has been the belief that accountability
for personal conduct is a deterrent to misconduct; thus fault ad-
vocates argue that tort liability is a deterrence to auto accidents.
No-fault proponents contend that fear of a law-suit or judgment
is no more a deterrent than fear of injury, a traffic ticket or a
license suspension and that, in any case, the negligent driver does
not pay his judgment-his insurer does it for him.
It would seem unprofitable to push either view to an ex-
treme. Concern for tort liability would, at least, seem to rein-
force the other incentives to drive safely and to encourage the
motorist to see to it other members of his household also drive
safely. Moreover, tort liability tends to remind the motorist
that he bears a responsibility for persons other than himself.
While the negligent driver's insurance company may pay the
judgment, the possibility of personal exposure over the policy lim-
its and higher insurance premiums remains a stimulant to pru-
dent driving.22
Even more important than deterrence, however, is the idea
that personal responsibility is a desirable social good and that the
operation of a motor vehicle is a kind of human activity for which
it is reasonable to hold a person responsible. Thus James C.
Mancuso, a psychologist, hypothesizes that to deprive a person of
the need to justify and defend his decisions is to deprive him of
the chance to become morally mature and that "there would be
loss to the general society when we legally inform people that
in many crucial instances they will be excused from the need to
20. Yet intoxication bars recovery under workmen's compensation.
See MINN. STAT. § 176.021(1) (1969).
21. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 8, at 271. The authors
concede that tort litigation recognizes the principle "that negligent mo-
toring should be surcharged because of its added contribution to the toll
of injuries," and that in cases of catastrophic proportions and clear
fault (for example, the drunk driver who permanently disables his
victim) "there is much to be said for visiting all that tort damages
entail on the person at fault." Id.
22. For a representative selection and discussion of the articles on
tort as a deterrent, see Special Committee on Automobile Accident
Reparations Report, 94 A.B.A. REP. 559, 637-640 (1969).
[Vol. 55":991
MINNESOTA PLAN
explain and justify their decisions about how to manage their
automobiles."23
Keeton speaks of the need to "exorcise" the concept of negli-
gence, implying that, like an evil spirit, it is something bad. But
to insist on responsibility and accountability in managing an au-
tomobile would not seem to be "bad"; on the contrary, it would
seem to be a good much to be desired. If a critical moral judg-
ment is to be pronounced, it should be redirected. It should be
addressed, first of all, to the climbing rate of auto accidents
which produce the need for reparations and, secondly, not against
personal responsibility in causing harm but against the lack of
society's collective responsibility to provide adequate reparations
for the harm. These two responsibilities are not mutually ex-
clusive; indeed, it would seem that for society to meet its collec-
tive responsibility, it is important that the individual's responsi-
bility be maintained.
III. REPARATION INSURANCE UNDER THE
ITNNESOTA NO-FAULT PLAN
As a substitute for insurance tied to personal conduct, Sen-
ator Davies' motorist is compelled to purchase first party insur-
ance. This is not a liability policy but basically a health and ac-
cident policy which pays to the insured his loss plus paying for
losses of others injured in auto-involved accidents. The cost of
the policy is directly related to what the policy proposes to pay
out as benefits. Consequently, the plan hopes to strike a bal-
ance, arriving at "a basic level of insurance which is socially re-
sponsible, but not so generous as to be inappropriate for com-
pelled purchase through government sanction. 2 4
A. COVERAGE AN BENEFTs
As a result of this compromise between complete coverage
and reasonable cost, the Davies compulsory policy does not cover,
for example, damage to automobiles or their contents (which ap-
parently would include a trucker's cargo). Instead, "[a] s to mo-
tor vehicles, property damage insurance will be voluntarly-pur-
23. Mancuso, Non-Fault: A Breakdown of Morality?, TiuAL 46
(Oct.-Nov. 1970). There is some evidence that legal deterrents do influ-
ence human behavior in the desired directions. See, e.g., Barmack &
Payne, The Lackland Accident Countermeasure Experiment, in AccmENT
REFSARcH 665 (1964); CAIF. DEP'T oF MoToR VEmIcLEs, REPORT ON TuE
RELATioNsHiP BErwn-2 CONCURRENT AccIDENTs AD CITATIONs (1965).
24. Davies, supra note 1, at 922-23.
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chased, first-party collision coverage." 2  Pragmatically, how-
ever, collision coverage will not be "voluntarily" purchased and
its cost should be calculated as part of the cost of the Davies plan.
Most automobiles on the road today represent a substantial in-
vestment to the owners. A motorist under the Davies plan is
compelled either to purchase separate collision coverage to pro-
tect that investment or to bear the entire loss of his auto when it
is damaged, even if destroyed by another driver who is wholly to
blame. No-fault advocates admit auto accident cases with small
injuries are now well compensated but are critical of compensa-
tion in the serious injury case. But consider:
(I) A 60 year old man loses his left leg above the knee in an
automobile accident. His hospital bill is $1500, his prosthesis is
$500 and his doctor bill is $500. He is an accountant earning
$2000 per month, and he loses two months from work. His social
and recreational activities are permanently impaired. Under the
tort system, his damage award might be $75,000 to $150,000, in-
cluding compensation for loss of earnings, medical expenses and
pain, suffering and disability. Under the Davies bill the account-
ant would have his doctor and hospital bills paid; he would re-
ceive $1500 of his $4000 wage loss (the maximum $750 a month for
two months), and he would receive a medical impairment benefit
of $3,510 ($5850 maximum for loss of leg less two percent for each
year of age in excess of 30 years at the time of injury up to a maxi-
mum reduction of 60 percent).
(II) A 30 year old housewife and mother is severely disfig-
ured as a result of facial burns in an auto accident. Her hospital
and medical expense is $15,000. She is disabled for six months
during which time she hires help at $400 per month. Prior to her
marriage, she had been employed as a registered nurse but has
had no employment outside the home for eight years. Under the
Davies plan, the housewife would be paid $15,000 for her medi-
cal expense, and $2400 for household help. She would also re-
ceive for her disfigurement an amount "not to exceed $2500."
Her total payments come to $19,900. Her cause of action in
negligence would be many times that amount.
(III) A 50 year old railroad switchman sustains a ruptured
disc in an auto accident. He is permanently disabled from his
work as a switchman, but he is capable of being employed at
other work. The doctors agree he has a 25 percent permanent
partial disability of the back. His hospital and medical bills total
25. Id. at 924.
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MINNESOTA PLAN
$2000. He was earning $12,000 per year at the time of his accident
and is able, after six months, to return to employment other than
that of a switchman at less pay. The Davies plan takes care of
his $2000 medical expenses and pays him $4500 loss of earnings
($750 per month maximum for six months) and medical impair-
ment benefits of $3750 (25 percent of $25,000 maximum for total
back disability less two percent per year for 20 years). His total
award under the no-fault plan is $10,200, substantially less than
an award under the tort system.
These three cases are perhaps sufficient to illustrate several
points:
(1) No allowance is made for loss of future earning capacity.
Work loss is limited to a maximum of $750 per month and is paid
only for "loss of income from work the injured person would have
performed had he not been injured" (See. 6, subd. (3)). The
housewife, the unemployed laborer, the non-working student, re-
ceive no recognition for their earning potential even though their
disability may be life-long.
(2) No allowance is made for pain or suffering; however, an
arbitrary sum-generally 50 percent of the Minnesota work-
men's compensation schedule-is allowed for an anomalous bene-
fit called "medical impairment,"26 which is defined as "consisting
of permanent bodily injury, whether or not affecting earnings or
earning power, including loss of members, loss of function, and
disfigurement." The same provision (See. 6, subd. (5)), specifi-
cally says, "[p]ain, suffering and inconvenience are not loss." On
the other hand, Davies in a later comment says medical impair-
ment benefits are "designed for cases in which there is significant
loss which transcends pure economic loss."127 Nothing is allowed
the injured party's spouse.
(3) Adoption of no-fault would also create new inequities
in differentiating between traffic and non-traffic victims. The
small child who is struck by a negligently operated automobile
and loses a leg will receive her '"net economic loss," but it may be
difficult to explain to the parents why their neighbor's child, who
loses a leg in a boating mishap or farm machinery accident, re-
ceives substantially more in a tort award.
26. In connection with workmen's compensation, it is interesting
to note that "[there is also a tendency to use the permanent partial dis-
ability award section of the workmen's compensation act to compen-
state for pain and suffering." Dahl, Seeing State Worlmee's Compen-
sation Programs in the 70's, in A.B.A., SEcuxoN OF INS., NEouamcrE &
COMPENSATION LAW, 1970 PROCEEDINGS 129, 132.
27. Davies, supra note 1, at 938.
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B. COST
There are really two consumers in auto injury reparations.
One is the victim, the person who is injured in an auto accident
and seeks adequate reparations. The other is the car owner who,
at least until he has experienced an auto injury of his own, is
likely to be more interested in what his insurance will cost him.
Senator Davies' article offers no cost estimates. Studies of
the Keeton-O'Connell proposal have suggested to some estimated
cost savings of 17 percent to 26 percent,28 while others estimate
no savings and greater costs. 29 The American Insurance Asso-
ciation has estimated that its plan, which is a complete no-fault,
would reduce costs of basic bodily injury coverage 25 percent,
while the Alliance Actuarial Committee's study of the AIA plan
found it would increase costs some 29 percent.3 0 Part of the dif-
ficulty in estimating costs would seem to be the wide variety of
variable assumptions that any cost study can make.
It should be kept in mind, too, that the prudent motorist is
unlikely to be satisfied with the coverage of the Basic Reparation
Policy, whatever its cost. As already stated, he also will want
collision coverage, and this adds to his premium. The average
repair bill for a damaged car in Minnesota has risen about 75 per-
cent in the last decade, from $170 to $350, and rising repair costs
are reported to be the key reason for increasing insurance rates."1
Indeed, one auto insurance company now advertises "a 20% dis-
count on collision insurance for any car the manufacturer certi-
fies, through independent tests, can take a five-mile-an-hour
crash into a test barrier (front and rear) without sustaining dam-
age."'32 It has been estimated that two-thirds of the auto insur-
ance premium is for property damage losses;8 8 the cost of the
Basic Reparation Policy does not include this item. In this con-
28. Bailey, Remarks, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 557.
29. See Wolfrum, Remarks, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 538.
30. Am. MUT. INS. ALLIANCE, ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE ADEQUACY
OF THE COSTINGS OF THE AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION'S "COMPLETE
PERSONAL PROTECTION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLAN" (1969).
31. Minneapolis Tribune, Nov. 29, 1970, § C, at 1, col. 2. The same
article quotes an insurance company representative as saying, "when a
three-year-old car is in a 10-mile-an-hour collision, it is cheaper for
us to replace it with another car or reimburse the owner for its value."
Id. at 5, col. 3.
32. TInE, Dec. 7, 1970, at 1.
33. 1969 DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE BULLETIN, No. 12, at 8. More-
over, a study in Wisconsin reveals approximately 56 percent of all
property damage incurred was paid for by the other party in the acci-
dent which would no longer be the case under no-fault. W. Hold, The
1000
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nection it is also interesting to note that in Minnesota there was
a 27.3 percent increase in property damage accidents in 1969 as
compared with 1968. 3 4
Moreover, a prudent driver probably also would want to
buy Added Reparation Coverage, a separate, optional policy pro-
vided for in Section 8 of the Davies bill. This "deluxe" coverage,
as Davies calls it,35 may cover, in addition to collision coverage,
medical expense and work loss not covered under basic protec-
tion as well as additional benefits for "medical impairment." Ap-
parently there are no estimates as to what this premium would
be, as the Davies bill would simply invite "the insurance market-
place to develop whatever additional coverages are desired by
insurance buyers. ' 3 6 While we cannot know the extra cost for
this coverage, it would seem probable, if not certain, that a ma-
jority of motorists would believe, as a matter of prudence, that
Added Reparation Coverage was necessary, and any discussion
of insurance costs must consider this coverage as a further cost
item.
The Minnesota motorist will have another decision to make
in buying his Basic Reparation Policy. Section 7, subdivision (2),
provides for deductibles from the basic coverage for the named in-
sured or a relative residing in the same household. Davies pre-
dicts that a substantial savings in premiums would result if the
policyholder chose to take deductibles. This is probably true, but
it means a further uncompensated loss the injured person en-
dures, a loss that would have been compensated under the tort
system Ironically, the poor person who buys deductible insur-
ance to save on premium costs is the person who can least afford
to absorb a $100 to $300 loss out of his own pocket.37
While the Basic Reparation plan restricts benefits paid, it ex-
pands the number of eligible claimants. The driver in the com-
Economic Impact of Automobile Accidents 283 (University of Wiscon-
sin, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1967), cited in Hold, Critique of
Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim: The Keeton and O'Connell
Proposal, in JUSTICE AND THE ADVERsARY SysTEn 189 (Am. Trial Law.
Ass'n 1967).
34. Property damage accidents increased from 64,255 in 1968 to
81,769 in 1969. Interestingly enough, fatal and non-fatal injury acci-
dents decreased 18.2 percent in the same period. Mnw. DW,'T oF PufLic
SAFETY, HiGHIGHTS oF Mw fSoTA MoToR VEwcLE TRAFmc AccmENTS FOR
JANUARY 1 THROUGH DEclIBara 31, 1969.
35. Davies, supra note 1, at 940.
36. Id. at 939-40. "Deluxe" coverage may be limited, however, to
the named insured or relatives residing in the same household. Others
injured would be limited to the basic minimum benefits.
37. See Hold, supra note 33, at 194.
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mon one-car accident and the claimants who are at least 50 per-
cent at fault, who do not presently recover under the tort system,
would now recover. Estimates on the increase in claims have
varied from 40 percent to 200 percent.8 8
The balance struck between benefits and cost will need con-
tinual adjustment, most likely upwards. For example, the Mas-
sachusetts no-fault law, enacted in August, 1970, required insur-
ance companies to reduce their rates across the board 15 percent.
Soon after the Massachusetts court invalidated this require-
ment,89 the state insurance commissioner granted a 38.4 percent
rate increase for property damage coverage.40 The experience
with workmen's compensation is also interesting. Workmen's
compensation was originally intended to replace a certain per-
centage of the employee's lost wages, usually some 50 percent to
66-2/3 percent. But between 1940 and 1966, as wage rates and
the standard of living increased, maximum weekly total disa-
bility benefits failed to keep up so that the ratio of benefits to
average weekly wages fell; for example, in Minnesota the ratio
fell from 77.4 percent to 40.8 percent. 41 Under the tort system,
however, the size of jury verdicts tends to reflect changes in the
general economy so that compensation paid tends automatically
to keep pace with changing economic conditions.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The key provision of the Davies bill is Section 2, subdivision
(1), which abolishes liability for damages arising from ordinary
negligence in the operation of motor vehicles. Davies observes,
"Were this subdivision enacted, and nothing more, no-fault reform
would be accomplished." 42 The trouble, however, is that with
"nothing more" the law would be unconstitutional.
Article I, Section 8, of the Minnesota Constitution provides,
in part: "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws
for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
38. Bailey, supra note 28, at 558. A 1955 Temple University study
of New Jersey auto accidents estimated an increase in claims of about
100 percent. Id.
39. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., - Mass. -,
263 N.E.2d 698 (1970).
40. Order dated November 10, 1970, Massachusetts Insurance Com-
missioner. See Minneapolis Tribune, Nov. 11, 1970, at 2, col. 6.
41. Mittelman, Workmen's Compensation Reform: The Prospects
for Federal Action, in A.B.A., SECTION OF INS., NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSA-
TION LA W, 1970 PROCEEDINGS 123, 125.
42. Davies, supra note 1, at 922.
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property or character .... " As our supreme court has said,
this provision was "not inserted in the constitution as a matter
of idle ceremony."4 3 To leave an injured motorist with no rem-
edy, not even his common law tort action, would seem to deprive
him of a "certain remedy" for the injury or wrong to his person.
Of course, the Davies bill does more, but the question may still
be put whether the injured motorist has been afforded, constitu-
tionally, a remedy. The remedy proposed is the Basic Repara-
tion Policy, presumably to be offered for sale by private insur-
ance companies. The only persons required to purchase the in-
surance are auto vehicle owners (Section 3). An owner who
knowingly fails to maintain the insurance is denied any benefits.
(Section 10 (4)).
The analogy to workmen's compensation immediately comes
to mind. The Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act also pro-
vides an insurance program in exchange for abrogation of the
employee's common law tort action; and that act has been held
to be constitutional. The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled
that fixed liability regardless of fault and the schedule of benefits
provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act are an "ade-
quate substitute" for the employee's common law action against
his employer.44
Workmen's compensation and no-fault auto insurance are
not, however, entirely parallel plans. The employee who gives
up his right to sue the employer does not have to buy workmen's
compensation insurance. Insurance coverage is provided for him
by his employer, and, indeed, if the employer fails to insure or
self-insure, the employee keeps his right to sue for damages at
common law. 45 On the other hand, the motor vehicle owner who
gives up his right to sue a negligent motorist is afforded no rem-
edy by the Davies bill other than self-help. The car owner is told
to protect himself by buying his own first party insurance; if he
fails to do so, he is denied any protection and has no "remedy."4"
It also might be argued that requiring the car owner to buy his
43. Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn. 542, 549, 57 N.W. 212, 213 (1893).
44. Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 436, 35 N.W.2d 719, 735(1949). See also Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv., 241 Minn.
523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954).
45. MIN. STAT. § 176.031 (1969).
46. The employee under workmen's compensation gives up only
his right to common law damages for personal injury or death. He
can still sue his employer for property damage loss. The car owner
under no-fault has no remedy for property loss, only the option to buy
collision coverage insurance at his own expense.
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own benefits violates Article I, Section 8, which further states a
person "ought to obtain justice freely and without purchase."
Undoubtedly, at times the legislature can constitutionally re-
quire persons to protect themselves, whether it be by wearing
safety helmets when riding motorcycles or by buying compul-
sory insurance if owning a car. The question here, however, is
not the reasonableness of the state's exercise of its police power
but the quite different question put explicitly by the Minnesota
Constitution that every person is entitled to a remedy for a
wrong. It would seem a proposal along the lines of the Davies
bill raises a question of considerable moment under Article I,
Section 8, of the state Constitution.
V. THE MINNESOTA PLAN FOR RESPONSIBLE REFORM
There is an alternative to "no-fault." For some years the
Motor Vehicle Insurance Committee of the Minnesota State Bar
Association has been fashioning what has come to be called the
Minnesota Plan.47 Calling it a plan for "responsible reform" is
not intended to add to the already overheated rhetoric of the
no-fault debate but to connote a plan which is responsive to the
needs of the traveling public and which recognizes personal re-
sponsibility as a factor in auto injury reparations. It may be of
interest to note that, as part of this reform plan, Minnesota al-
ready has a measure of no-fault insurance.
The Minnesota Plan builds on what we already have, namely
the tort system which recognizes personal responsibility and yet
is a non-exclusive remedy; that is, under the tort system, the in-
jured motorist, whether at fault or not, has sources of recovery
other than tort. About nine out of ten seriously injured persons
presently receive some form of compensation for economic loss,48
from various existing voluntary and involuntary compensation
plans such as workmen's compensation, sick leave, welfare, so-
cial security, Blue Cross and Blue Shield and other health and
accident policies. When one looks at the total picture it appears
that "[there is not much sense in destroying systems that are
working in order to set up a new system which will be less effi-
cient, at its very best, than some of the systems it sets aside."' D
The need, then, is to improve the "total picture."
47. BENCH AND BAR OF MINN. 47-56 (May-June, 1970).
48. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT INxuRIs 37 (1970).
49. Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus in the Automobile
Injury Impasse, 52 A.B.A.J. 533, 538 (1966).
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In any auto injury reparations system it would appear advis-
able to retain the admitted advantages of the tort system, which
include the stress on personal responsibility, the recognition to
some degree that one's cost of motoring bears a relationship to
how safely one drives, an awareness that personal injury is just
that-an injury to a person, not a statistical economic unit, which
cannot be arbitrarily reduced to some out-of-pocket loss-and
the ability to fashion just and complete compensation for "in-
determinate" obligations and the serious injury. Professor Con-
ard has put it well:
Nothing that has been disclosed by recent factual research
or the experience of foreign countries has indicated that the
tort system of reparation for automobile injuries should be abol-
ished. To be sure, it has been shown to be inadequate; that is a
reason for supplementing it, not for abolishing it. It has been
shown to be expensive; that is a good reason for shifting to
other regimes the things that they can do better. But there re-
main many tasks that the tort system alone can perform.
These include, in appropriate cases, the restoration of earn-
ings above the minimal level that a universal insurance system
will support, the reparation of property loss and psychic loss,
the vindication of the innocent, and the punishment or admoni-
tion of the guilty. The tort system should be preserved and
considerably amended to achieve these purposes.50
The tort system does not purport to compensate everyone.
The Minnesota driver who is more to blame for his accident than
the party with whom he collides, or who may be involved in a
one car accident, does not recover in tort.51 In such cases the
motorist understands that he must provide for or absorb his own
loss and cannot expect someone else who is not at fault or is less
at fault to pay it for him. The motorist should, therefore, have
the opportunity to acquire first party coverage for these situa-
tions, especially hospital, medical and temporary disability or
wage loss insurance. Some persons already have this kind of cov-
erage by reason of employment fringe benefits, and others should
be able to obtain it at a relatively modest cost. Then, too, within
50. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63
Micmn L. REV. 279, 306-07 (1964). Professor Dix W. Noel, one of the
scholars commissioned by the Department of Transportation to prepare
an advisory paper on negligence law, concludes his study by quoting the
above remarks of Conard with approval. Noel, Comparison of Strict
Liability in Products Area and Auto Accident Reparations, in U.S.
DEP'T Or TRANSP., THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPmwT OF THE NEGLIGENCE Ac-
TEoN 67, 89 (1970).
51. According to the DOT probability sample survey about 47 per-
cent of persons injured receive some tort reparations. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANsP., supra note 48, at 38. Presumably in Minnesota, which has
comparative negligence, the percentage of persons recovering in tort
would be appreciably higher.
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the tort system itself there are several deficiencies, namely, the
insurance gap (where the defendant is uninsured and finan-
cially irresponsible), the insolvency gap (the defendant's insurer
is insolvent) and the limits gap (the limits of defendant's policy
are insufficient to pay the judgment) .52 Here again, by rela-
tively simple measures such as uninsured motorist coverage and
basic limits coverage under the financial responsibility law, these
gaps can be closed.
The Minnesota Plan adopts the broad-gauged approach above
outlined, and the 1969 state legislature, as part of this program,
enacted:
1. Mandatory availability of uninsured motorist coverage.
MINN. STAT. § 72A.149 (3) (1969).
2. Mandatory availability of supplemental insurance cov-
erage to the named insured of $10,000 accidental death
benefits and up to $3120 in wage continuation benefits,
plus medical expense coverage up to $2000 to any insured.
MINN. STAT. § 72A.1494 (1969).
Chapter 713 is "no-fault" first party insurance. It supplements
the tort system by affording compensation to the motorist to
cover, to a moderate extent and in certain instances, his own
losses.
3. Abolition of contributory negligence and adoption of com-
parative negligence in all, not just auto, negligence ac-
tions. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1969).
4. Prohibition of the family exclusion rider in auto insur-
ance policies. MINN. STAT. § 72A.1491 (1969).
5. Better regulation of auto insurance cancellations.
This is a substantial and heartening beginning to creative
and responsible reform, and additional improvements are con-
templated. The legislative program is being supplemented by
the auto insurers' program of advance payments, a plan of ad-
vancing money for expenses to claimants prior to final settle-
ment, credit being given on final settlement for the advances.
In addition, the Minnesota Plan has a program of highway safety,
encompassing such critical areas as automobile design, driving
and liquor and traffic law enforcement. 53
52. These three gaps are recognized and discussed in Special
Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations Report, supra note 22,
at 634-37.
53. No-fault advocates contend auto claims are delayed because
auto accident cases congest court calendars. This is not true in Minne-
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Along with better coverage and benefits and a strong traffic
safety program, there should be an emphasis on controlling costs.
Consideration of collateral source benefits and tort reparations
might well yield some savings in costs by avoiding double recov-
ery of certain expenses. Perhaps little can be done with infla-
tionary medical and hospital costs and auto repair bills, except
that in the latter case, as we have seen, better auto design can re-
duce premium costs for property damage coverage. But another
cost item which has received attention is legal fees in the han-
dling of tort claims. The claimant's need for a lawyer's help,
whether under a fault or a no-fault system, is not seriously ques-
tioned. As Davies points out, "disputes under no-fault will be
primarily on issues of causation, amount of medical impairment
and amount of survivor's loss," and "[ s]ome disputes and legal
actions will still occur."54  (And since no-fault benefits are usu-
ally at minimum levels, a no-fault claimant may be less able
than the tort claimant to cover the expense of legal help out of
his recovery.)
As the Department of Transportation studies point out, the
filing of a tort suit is a "relatively rare event."1' 5 Most claims
are settled before suit with or without a lawyer, the relatively
few jury verdicts serving as a measurement for settlement.
About 65 percent of tort claimants retain counsel, and 74 percent
of this number actually file a lawsuit, with about eight percent of
the lawsuits reaching a verdict.50 There does not appear to be
any definite data on retention of counsel for tort claims in Minne-
sota. With the advent of comparative negligence, however, it
may be that counsel will be retained by claimants less often since
there will be less outright denial of claims by insurers on the
basis of contributory negligence.
The question of legal costs raises the question of contingent
sota. 'Delay attributable to court congestion is not a factor. A civiljury trial may be had in any county within twelve months of filing the
note of issue." Report of the Senate Counsel to Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, citing OFFICE OF SENATE CouNSEr, THE JuDiciA. SYsTvm Inm" E-
soTA 130-33 (1969),- and OFFIcE OF THE ADAmnISTRATVE ASSISTANT TO TH
Mim'n'SOTA SupRN COURT, SIxTH AwNAL REPORT 6 (1969).
54. Davies, The Minnesota Proposal for No-Fault Auto Insurance, 54
MixNn. L. REv. 921, 945 (1970).
55. 2 U.S. DEP'T or TRANSP., EcoNoiIc CoNsEquENcEs OF AuToMo-
BrE AccmEnr IN'uRuEs 3 (1970).
56. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANP., supra note 48, at 49. Attorney repre-
sentation in paid tort cases averaged 46.5 percent in the DOT sample
survey of 19 states, with five states having ratios in excess of the average
and six states having a ratio of less than 30 percent 1 U.S. DET'T OF
Taasp., AUToMoIL PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 78 (1970).
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fees. The Department's study puts legal costs at an average of
25 percent of total recovery under the tort system.57 The con-
tingent fee enables the injured person who could not otherwise
afford legal counsel to have representation, and undoubtedly
under any no-fault plan the contingent fee would still be present.
While it appears that sufficient data is not yet available,18 there
is some indication that the contingent fee received in small cases
is commensurate with an hourly fee charge while, as the size of
the recovery increases, the increase in the fee may become ex-
cessive for the amount of additional work performed.5" There is
also some evidence, however, that in a lawyer's case load, taken
as a whole, the generous fee is offset by undercharges (or no
charges) in other cases.60 While it would appear that the con-
tingent fee, in some form, is here to stay because it provides a
method for every claimant to obtain competent legal services
when needed, an effort should be made to assure that, in the case
of a large recovery, considerations other than the percentage fig-
ure alone are taken into account, so that the fee does not exceed
what is reasonable for the time, effort and professional skill in-
volved.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are numerous inherent weaknesses in the Davies "no-
fault" scheme. It rests on unsupportable assumptions as to the
impossibility of determining fault, a concept well within the com-
mon sense experience of jurors. It provides inadequate benefits
for injuries and economic loss and fails to compensate at all for
many of the damages suffered by an accident victim. While
Senator Davies contends that the cost of his first party insur-
ance would be lower than the cost of present liability insurance,
the studies of the point are inconclusive at best, several suggest-
ing that costs would increase rather than decrease under a "no-
fault" system; in fact, experience in the only state which has
tried a no-fault plan has indicated that costs have increased.
57. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 48, at 48. Persons retain-
ing counsel tend to recover a higher proportion of their losses. Id. at 52.
58. For an interesting theoretical study see Schwartz & Mitchell,
An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litiga-
tion, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).
59. F. MAcKiNNON, CONTINGENT FEEs FOR LEGAL SEmvcEs 172 (1964),
cited in Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations Report,
supra note 22, at 632, which points out that more cost data on hours
worked in various kinds of cases is needed before more than tentative
conclusions can be made.
60. F. MAcKINNoN, supra note 59, at 182.
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Where coupled with the inadequate coverage of the Basic Repar-
ation Policy and the availability of full coverage at greater cost,
it seems altogether likely that the average driver will incur
greater expense under the "cost-cutting" Davies plan than he
does at present. Finally, there are substantial questions whether
the proposal provides the "certain remedy in the laws" guaran-
teed by the Minnesota Constitution.
It cannot be denied that reform is required of our present
method of auto injury reparations. But to describe the problem
as an "either-or" issue, as being fault or no-fault, liability insur-
ance or first party insurance or, more lucidly, revolution or the
status quo is a misleading distortion and a disservice both to leg-
islators who must make the laws and to the motoring public
which must abide by them. The solution is not to dismantle the
present system but to improve it. This has been the goal of the
'Minnesota Plan" described above.01 While more needs to be
done, the solution is to make needed reforms within the present
system, not to adopt new, untried proposals, such as the Davies
bill, which would radically change the basis of reparations for
injuries and introduce many new weaknesses.
61. Pennsylvania appears to be taking an approach similar to the
Minnesota Plan. A report of the state's Action Committee for Highway
Safety, chaired by Professor Herbert Denenberg of the Wharton School
of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania, has rec-
ommended greater use of collision coverage deductibles, expanded med-
ical pay coverage and first-person auto accident death insurance. The
committee says a $10,000 death policy would cost $5 per year, while 200
weeks of $50 disability protection could also be bought for $5 per person
per year. Medical pay coverage could be increased from $500 to
$5000 for an additional $5 per year. New York Times, Jan. 3, 1971, § 3, at
3, col. 1.
100919711

